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Use of Force and Constitutionalism
LoRI FISLER DAMROSCH*

Are constitutional democracies more inclined than other kinds of
regimes to observe the international law of the United Nations Charter
on use of force? Are they relatively more vulnerable to unlawful
behavior by others? How can constitutionaldemocracies ensure fidelity
to their underlying constitutional principles when they engage in
multinational military operations for preservation or restoration of
international peace? These and related questions at the intersection of
the international and national legal orders merit careful attention as
political structures around the world undergo post-Cold War
transformation.1
As international lawyer, constitutional lawyer, and astute observer
of political behavior, Louis Henkin has endeavored to persuade the
skeptics that law does influence and constrain the conduct of governmental actors, even when vital security interests are at stake. In How
Nations Behave,2 Henkin undertook to show the multifaceted ways in
which the international law of the use of force does more than provide
a rhetoricaljustification for policies dictated by self-interest: rather, the
law itself shapes the range of choices plausibly available to governments and weighs in their calculations of interest (though legal
considerations may not necessarily predominate over all others). In
ForeignAffairs and the Constitutior and other writings examining the
United States system, he endorses the U.S. framers' conception of
bringing war powers under constitutional control, principally through
* Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. Copyright © Lori Fisler
Damrosch, 1997.
I. In a project which owes much to Henkin's inspiration, I am engaged in an ongoing
study of how approximately twenty mature constitutional democracies have regulated their
military activities in the half-century since World War II. This effort to distill the experiences
of the well-established democracies in the war-and-peace sphere aims to understand whether
there is a common core of constitutionalism that works to constrain illegitimate uses of force
while allowing effective defensive responses and contributions to collective security. For
previous short pieces giving glimpses of this research in progress, see Lori Fisler Damrosch,
ConstitutionalControl Over War Powers: A Common Core ofAccountability in Democratic
Societies?, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 181 (1995). See also Lori Fisler Damrosch, Is There a
GeneralTrend in ConstitutionalDemocracies Toward ParliamentaryControlOver War-andPeace Decisions?, PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. (forthcoming 1997). With the support of the

United States Institute of Peace (where the author spent a sabbatical year in residence in 199596), a book-length treatment of this subject is now in preparation.
2. Louis HENKIN, HOWNATIONS BEHAVE (2d ed. 1979).
3. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTTUTION (2d ed. 1996).
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a requirement of legislative participation in the judgment to initiate war.
In a variety of other works as well as in his teaching and collegial
interactions, he has continued these investigations and has related them
to themes of constitutionalism and the spread of constitutional ideas.
A common thread among these inquiries is the propositionthat the
internal and international rule of law should be closely connected and
that constitutional and internationallaw can work together to control the
use of military force. Skeptics about the role of law in regulating force
would contest each aspect of that claim: they would deny the relevance
of international law and constitutional law, separately or in combination; or worse, they would disparage constitutionalism as another
version of "legalism-moralism"detrimentalto national and international
security.' Just as Henkin has forcefully criticized such standpoints with
respect to international law in How NationsBehave, a critique from the
perspective of comparative constitutional law is in order. Such a
critique should examine a range of constitutional democracies and
should endeavor to integrate the insights of a growing literature in
political science that explores connections between internal political
organization and international peace and security. The present essay
can only touch on a few aspects of interest concerning this relationship,
with emphasis on points most closely connected to the themes of
Henkin's own work.
The essay begins with what Henkin has intimated about the
connections between the two planes of international and national law
concerning use of force (Part I), and then turns to the connections
between internal democracy and international peace as a problem for
philosophical and empirical investigation (Part II). It draws on
illustrations from selected post- 1945 conflicts between democratic ruleof-law states on one hand and nondemocratic autocracies on the other,
which represent different facets of the problem of war-involvement of
democratic states: (1) democracies as "initiators" of the use of force as
in Suez in 1956; (2) democracies as the objects or targets of use of force

4. See, e.g., CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES

CONSTITUTION ABROAD (Louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal eds., 1990) [hereinafter
INFLUENCE]; CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1990); THE AGE OF

RIGHTS (1990); INTERNATIONAL LAW: PoLrncs, VALUES AND FUNCTIONS: GENERAL COURSE
ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Collected Courses, Hague Academy of International Law,
1989-IV) [hereinafter GENERAL COURSE].
5. The term "legalistic-moralistic" comes from GEORGE KENNAN, AMERICAN
DIPLOMACY, 1900-1950 82 (1951). For Henkin's critique of Kennan, Hans Morgenthau, Dean
Acheson and other disparagers of "legalism" in international relations, see HOW NATIONS
BEHAVE, supra note 2, at 322-39.
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by nondemocracies, as in the Falklands war of 1982; and (3) democracies as voluntary participants in multinational military operations in
conflicts originating between nondemocratic parties, as in the Korean
war of 1950-1953 or the Persian Gulf war of 1991 (Parts III-V).
Building on the insights of political theorists and political
scientists who have investigated connections between democracy and
peace, the essay suggests that constitutional controls on one but not both
of the parties to an international dispute may be insufficient to prevent
the outbreak of violent conflict between them. An explanation may be
that constitutional democracies have too often failed to signal their own
"lines in the sand"-that is, the circumstances under which they would
indeed respond with large-scale force to a nondemocratic state's attempt
to change the status quo.
I.

HENKIN ON DOMESTIC CONSTITUTIONALISMAND INTERNATIONAL

LAW

In How Nations Behave, Henkin expresses a belief in correlations
between internal governance and international law-observance, even
going so far as to claim that "[i]n general, Western-style democracies
have tended to observe international law more than do others."6 He
asserts, for example, that societies accustomed to the rule of law
domestically are more likely to honor international legal rules,7 and that
"open, stable domestic societies with freer institutions" will generate

6. HOW NATIONS BEHAVE, supra note 2, at 63; see also GENERAL COURSE, supranote
4, at 89 ("Constitutional and other State law may determine whether, to what extent, and how
effectively a State carries out its obligations under international law."); cf id. at 72 (discussing
the internal motivations for states to comply with international law, without differentiating
among states by virtue of their regime types).
For a narrower version of a comparable claim, see Michael W. Doyle, Michael Doyle
on the Democratic Peace-Again, in DEBATING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE 365 (Michael E.
Brown et al. eds., 1996)[hereinafter DEBATING] ("Liberal institutions, principles and interests
should also provide a firm foundation for international law, leading liberal states to abide by
international law more reliably in dealings with each other than do other pairs of states.").
Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State in the Clinton Administration, has contended that
"democracies are demonstrably more likely to maintain their international commitments... and
less likely to make war on each other" than other forms of government. See Strobe Talbott,
Democracyand the National Interest,75 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov./Dec. 1996, at 47, 49 (noting
continuity with the positions of Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt and others
on democracy as a force for peace).
7. See How NATIONS BEHAVE, supra note 2, at 60-68 (citing the United States as a
leading example of a nation reflecting "internal forces impelling observance of international
law," and noting constitutional, institutional, and cultural factors tending toward this
phenomenon).
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internal pressure for compliance with international law.' These
propositions are linked to his agenda for the advancement of human
rights: for example, freedom of the press makes violations of international law harder to conceal, and openness of debate over governmental
policies exerts domestic pressure to abide by international law,
including the international rules on use of force. 9
Concerning specific constitutional features such as separation of
powers, Henkin acknowledges competing tendencies: checks and
balances may make it more difficult for nations to initiate or participate
in unlawful war (if both the legislative and the executive branches are
required to agree on the military policy); 10 but divided government may
also offer more opportunity for one branch to place a nation in violation
of international law against another branch's better judgment." He
reminds us that congressional sponsorship of such solemn treaty
obligations as the U.N. Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty has served
as an important assurance of U.S. support for those commitments and
has enhanced the credibility of the undertakings."2
With regard to the dispositions ofthe U.S. Constitution concerning
war powers, Henkin sees special merit in the framers' decisionto opt for
a checks-and-balances approach:
In foreign affairs, too, neither the framers nor we were (are)
disposed to sacrifice parliamentary supremacy to the
executive-what the British had won in the "Glorious
Revolution." In foreign affairs, too, we want neither an
imperial President nor an imperial Congress. Our kind of
constitutionaldemocracy ought to eschew large powers in

8. Id. at317.
9. See id. at63-64,317-18.
10. See id at 63-64; cf id. at 150 ("Domestic restraints on going to war also have special
relevance... [S]ometimes there are also constitutional and institutional obstacles."). In the
United States, for example, opponents (in the Congress and elsewhere) of U.S. involvement in
Vietnam invoked arguments of international law. Id. at 349 n.36.
11. Compare the passages cited in the preceding note with that in id at 75 ("In the United
States, international law sometimes suffers from the separation of branches in the national
government .... "). The examples given in the latter connection do not involve the use of
force, however.
12. See id. at 65 ("That important congressional leaders initiated, sponsored, and fought
for N.A.T.O. or the United Nations will help to assure their continued support for the
obligations undertaken at least for some years."); ia at 85 (N.A.T.O. and similar arrangements
"are in the form of a treaty to underscore the solemnity of the undertaking and to assure the
parties as well as the potential enemy that the undertaking will be carried out").
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one set of hands, surely in matters of war and peace implicat13
ing the life and death of the citizens and the nation.
I have added the emphasis to suggest that perhaps the point is
generalizable
to other comparable democracies (whichever those may
14
be).

But the U.S. constitutional model does not necessarily secure
compliance with the international law on the use of force. In certain
notorious episodes of recent years, U.S. Presidents have embarked on
military initiatives in questionable fidelity to either constitutional or
international law; Henkin has been the sternest of critics in those
cases. 5 His writings expose a variety of respects in which the U.S.
constitutional experience has been suboptimal from the point of view of
ensuring compliance
with international law, in the military sphere or
16
otherwise.

Other states have confronted similar challenges but solved them
differently. Henkin's explorations of comparative constitutionalism

13. CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 4, at 38-39
(emphasis added); see also id. at 23 (the framers "were committed to limited government and
individual rights and therefore rejected the great achievement of England's 'Glorious
Revolution,' parliamentary supremacy." The framers feared tyranny, "whether of a King or
President or the tyranny of a majority represented in Congress."); cf THE AGE OF RIGHTS,
supra note 4, at 162 ("In the United States, instructed perhaps by their recent difficulties with
Great Britain, the framers saw rights as freedom from abuse by legislatures as much as (or more
than) by the executive.").
On the hypothetical possibility that the Congress might decide for war over the
President's objection, see HENKIN, supra note 3, at 379 n.28.
14. But cf CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supranote 4, at
40, where the term "our kind of democracy" is used in a context implying the uniqueness rather
than the generalizability of the U.S. experience; see also id. at 37 ("unique, dual democracy").
15. See, e.g., GENERAL COURSE, supra note 4, at 156-59 (concerning violations of
international law by the United States in Nicaragua and Panama); see also Louis Henkin, Use
of Force: Law and U.S. Policy [hereinafter Law and U.S. Policy], in RIGHT V. MIGHT:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 37, 47-50, 52-56, 60(Louis Henkin et al. eds., 2d
ed. 1991) [hereinafter RIGHT V. MIGHT]; CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, supra note 4, at 40 ("no constitutional excuse" for Reagan Administration's disregard
of Congress in its Nicaraguan policy); CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, supra note 4, at 40 n.* (U.S. intervention in Grenada questionable under both
international lav and U.S. constitutional law). For additional criticisms of the Grenada
operation in the light of international law, see RIGHT V. MIGHT, supra, at 54, 60, 68 n.29; see
also GENERAL COURSE, supranote 4, at 154 n.*. Henkin criticized the U.S. bombing of Libya
in, for example, Law and U.S. Policy, supra,at 46, 54, 60; GENERAL COURSE, supra note 4,
at 160. See generally Louis Henkin, The Invasion ofPanama Under InternationalLaw: A
DangerousPrecedent, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 293 (1991).
16. He deals, inter alia, with inadequacies concerning treaty implementation and
application of customary international law in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 3, at 206-211,236-246; see also GENERAL COURSE, supranote 4, at 94-98, 101, 104.
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have done much to promote awareness of the contributions of diverse
constitutional traditions toward securing the rule of law in international
as well as domestic affairs. 7 In that spirit, it is appropriate to identify
the trends in philosophical and political debate as to whether or not
regime type influences proclivity to war. 8
II.

CONSTITUTIONALISM AND "DEMOCRATIC PEACE":
EXPLANATIONS

COMPETING

The idea of constitutional control over war powers originated in
the political theories of the Enlightenment. More than two hundred
years ago, the outlines of a theory-or more than one theory-linking
constitutional organizationto international peace were already in place.
The American framers, drawing eclectically from diverse ideas, devised
a system under which no one man or body of men could take the
republic into war: 9 The requirement of congressional participation in
that most solemn national decision was explained as a restraint on the
proclivities of the executive toward war.20 By providing that war
powers be shared between legislative and executive branches, the
framers charted their own course differing from antecedent political
theorists, notably Locke and Montesquieu, who had envisioned external

17. See generally INFLUENCE, supra note 4, at 1-5, 12-15, 383-95 (discussing crossfertilization of constitutional ideas, for example between Europe and the United States, as well
as the spread of such ideas to other parts of the world); see also THE AGE OF RIGHTS, supra
note 4, at 161-67 (on French contributions to the evolution of constitutionalism, including
advances in checking abuses by the executive branch). For discussion of diverse approaches
to the relationship between international and domestic law, see GENERAL COURSE, supra note
4, at 98-101.
18. For an initial effort in this direction, see Damrosch, supra note 1.
19. As framer James Wilson explained:
This system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it.
It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to
involve us in such distress; for the important power of declaring war is
vested in the legislature at large: this declaration must be made with the
concurrence of the House of Representatives: from this circumstance we
may draw a certain conclusion that nothing but our national interest can
draw us into a war.
Statement of James Wilson, quoted in W. TAYLOR REVELEY III, WAR POWERS OF THE
PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: WHO HOLDS THE ARROWS AND OLIVE BRANCH? 102 (1981).
20. James Madison wrote, for example, that the Constitution "supposes, what the History
of all Govts demonstrates, that the Ex. is the branch of power most interested in war, & most
prone to it. It has accordingly with studied care, vested the question of war in the Legisl."
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 2, 1798) in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 312 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906). See also Michael W. Doyle, Kant, LiberalLegacies,
andForeignAffairs, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF 205, 225 n.23 (1983) (citing Thomas Paine for the
claim that democracy and war are incompatible).
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powers (including the war powers) as belonging with the executive arm
of government."a The newly created President would not be an elective
version of King George III but would need congressional authorization
for external military engagements.
Meanwhile, just a few years after the framing of the U.S. Constitution, Immanuel Kant advanced the ambitious contention that the spread
of republican governance could not only avoid the kinds of ill-advised
or ruinous wars to which tyrants were prone, but could even lead to a
firm peace among like-minded polities.22 In recent years, the Kantian
insight has been the object of intensive research in the field of political
science. Almost two centuries of wars between and among countries of
differing political structures have now been subjected to increasingly
sophisticated scrutiny and analysis, with the objective of understanding
whether democratic political organization promotes peace.
Within this body of political science research, ever-stronger
evidence has validated a correlation between internal governance and
international peace, through empirical proof of the so-called democratic
peace hypothesis-that democracies do not fight each other.23 The
accumulated weight of empirical evidence strongly supports the
existence of the democratic peace, especially for the period from 1945

21. Montesquieu had said, for example, that "[v]hen once an army is established, it ought
not to depend immediately on the legislative, but on the executive power; and this from the
very nature of the thing, its business consisting more in action than in deliberation." BARON
CHARLES Louis MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS, Book XI, ch. 6 (Thomas Nugent trans.,
rev. by J.V. Prichard, 1952).
Locke distinguished among legislative, executive, and what he called "federative"
powers, the latter containing "the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all the
transactions with all persons and communities without the commonwealth." In his view,
though executive and federative powers were distinct categories, they belonged with the same
body:
For both of them requiring the force of society for their exercise, it is almost
impracticable to place the force of the commonwealth in distinct and not
subordinate hands, or that the executive and federative power should be placed
in persons that might act separately, whereby the force of the public would be
under different commands, which would be apt some time or other to cause
disorder and ruin.
John Locke, An Essay Concerningthe True OriginalExtent andEnd ofCivil Government, ch.
XII (1690).
22. See Immanuel Kant, To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795), in
PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS ON PoLITIcs, HISTORY, AND MORALS

107-39 (Ted

Humphrey trans., 1983).
23. The literature on the democratic peace is by now voluminous. For book-length
treatments (with bibliographies), see, e.g., DEBATING, supra note 6. See generally BRUCE
RUSSETF, GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE (1993); BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA & DAVID
LALMAN, WAR AND REASON (1992) [hereinafter WAR AND REASON].
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forward. 4 Although not all the "realists" are yet persuaded,25 the most
interesting recent work has moved beyond establishing the correlation
to seeking its explanation.
Theories about the democratic peace tend to cluster in two groups:
normative-cultural explanations and structural-institutional ones.26 In
the normative-culturalexplanations, one sees echoes of Henkin's belief
that states with a strong domestic rule-of-law tradition will be more
likely to abide by international law. The contention is that in contrast
to authoritarianregimes (which typically rely on violent repression for
domestic stability), democratic states have internalized the norms of
resolving conflict without resort to violence; thus they are expected to
pursue their international aims pacifically as well (at least with respect
to states committed to similar norms).
Structural-institutional explanations, on the other hand, point to
features of liberal-democratic systems that could act as brakes on
conflict-initiation, as the American framers and Kant in PerpetualPeace
had long ago suggested. 7 To the extent that executive military powers
are subject to checks and balances-for example, by accountability to
the legislature-war (or at least war-initiation) ought to become less
likely under the structural-institutional view. Latter-day exponents of
24. For full discussion of evidence spanning a variety of periods and ruling out alternative
explanations, see generally RussErr, supra note 23, at 3-23; for a focus on the period since
World War Ii, see id. at 72-98; cf Steve Chan, Mirror,Mirroron the Wall... Are the Freer
CountriesMore Pacific?, 28 J. CoNFLICT REs. 617, 642 (1984) (earlier periods show more warinvolvement of democratic countries than recent periods).
For a different view of the significance of the evidence concerning the post-1945
period, see Henry S. Farber & Joanne Gowa, Politiesand Peace, in DEBATING, supra note 6,
at 239, 258-61, and related work cited therein. These authors aie unpersuaded by the
democratic peace hypothesis, in part because they do not find it confirmed by pre-1945 data
(though they acknowledge that it is strongly supported by post-1945 data) and because they
believe that there are better explanations for the fact that democracies did not fight each other
during the Cold War.
25. See, e.g., the several essays under the heading "The Case Against the Democratic
Peace," in DEBATING, supra note 6, at 157-334.
26. For description and analysis of the two kinds of explanations, see RussETr, supra note
23, at 30-42. Several of the essays in DEBATING, supra note 6, are addressed toward proving
or disproving one or both of the explanations. Compare John M. Owen, How Liberalism
ProducesDemocraticPeace, in DEBATING, supranote 6, at 116, with Christopher Layne, Kant
or Cant: The Myth of the DemocraticPeace, in DEBATING, supranote 6, at 157, and Farber &
Gowa, supra note 24.
27. For the proposition that Kantian theory assumes a diffusion of war powers among
multiple decision-makers, see Fernando Tes6n, The Kantian Theory of InternationalLaw, 92
COLUM. L. REv. 53, 74-75, nm.119-21 (1992); see also Russett, Why DemocraticPeace?,in
DEBATING, supranote 6, at 82, 100 ("Kant's own view argued that institutionalconstraints-a
structure of division of powers, checks and balances-would make it difficult for democratic
leaders to move their countries into war"); RUSSETr, supra note 23, at 4.
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the Kantian claim have thus hypothesized that structural constraints on
executive military powers belong among the factors that may well
explain (or help explain) the peace among democracies. 2' For this
reason, democracy-and-peace research has pointed to the extent of
constraints on the chief executive as one of the components of democracy which ought to be measured and studied in relation to the warinvolvement of democratic regimes; 29 but the role of such constraints
in keeping democratic polities from becoming involved in wars (or
certain wars) is still only imperfectly understood." The perceptionthat
one's adversary is (or is not) constrained may be just as important as
actual constraints: "the presence of democratic institutions provides a
visible and generally correct signal of 'practical dovishness'-restraints
on war in the form of institutional constraint if not of inherent
disposition."31
The most prominent published work investigating the competing
theories suggests that either the normative-cultural explanation or the
structural-institutional explanation may be plausible; but neither has

28. The leading article launching the modem revival of the Kantian hypothesis is Doyle,
supra note 20. In designating states as "liberal" or "illiberal" for purposes of his analysis of
war-involvement, Doyle considers as an essential attribute of liberalism "the requirement that
the legislative branch have an effective role in public policy" and that "representative
government is internally sovereign (... especially over military and foreign affairs)." Id. at
212. Thus, for example, he excludes pre-World War I Germany from his catalogue of liberal
states, largely on the ground that the Kaiser's control of military policy was unchecked by a
legislature that otherwise had substantial policy-making authority. However, Doyle does not
make a separate investigation of the criterion of legislative constraint on the executive, apart
from its use to assign states to either the "liberal" or "illiberal" category.
29. For references to some of the political science literature on measuring executive
constraints and/or on correlating such constraints to patterns of war-involvement, see
Damrosch, supra note 1, at 191 n.28. For treatment of related questions, including the possible
significance for war-involvement of parliamentary as compared to presidential forms of
governance, see references in DEBATING, supranote 6, at xxxii n.19.
30. For commentary on some questions that could benefit from interdisciplinary dialogue
between political scientists and lawyers, see Damrosch, supranote 1, at 190-93.
31. RussETr, supra note 23, at 39 (citing WAR AND REASON, supra note 23, at 157-58)
(the "presence of democratic institutions provides a basis for rivals to have an above-average
prior belief that the potential foe is restrained from using force too readily. When this restraint
exists for both sides, amicable settlements of disputes are more likely." ). See also WAR AND
REASON, supranote 23, at 272 ("When both sides are democracies, each actor is likely to be
dovish, to see the other as dovish, and to be encouraged to pursue negotiated solutions to
differences."); RussETr, supra note 23, at 141 n.17 (tracing precursors of "the insight that
forms of government signal a state's likely international behavior"). Conversely, where one
or both sides do not perceive the other as possessing democratic institutions (e.g., U.S.
perception of Spain in 1898), the restraint may fail to take effect.
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been conclusively established to date.32 Skeptics about the democratic
peace typically cite the difficulties in explaining the phenomenon as one
reason for doubting its existence. It is said, among other things, that
either the normative-cultural or the structural-institutional explanations
ought to lead to the conclusion that democracies should be more pacific
in general; but such a conclusion is widely viewed as lacking empirical
foundation.33 Indeed, most proponents of the democratic peace
hypothesis concede that the available evidence does not support the
view that democracies are more pacific than nondemocracies; all that
can be empirically sustained is that democracies are more pacific in
their relations with each other than in their relations with
nondemocracies (or than nondemocracies are in their relations with any
regime).34
Moreover, the opponents contend (and some proponents
concede) not only that democracies are as conflict-prone as other
regime-types, but also that they are just as likely to be the initiators of
violence in their disputes with non-democratic regimes.3 Focusing for
present purposes only on examples from the post-1945 period,36 those
32. See RUSSETr, supra note 23, at 87-92, 119-20; see generallyT. Clifton Morgan &
Sally Howard Campbell, Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War: Why Kant
Democracies Fight?, 35 J. CONFLICT RES. 187 (1991).
33. See, e.g., Layne, supra note 26, at 157, 164; Farber & Gowa, supra note 24, at 24344.
34. On this point, see, e.g., RUSSETT, supranote 23, at 139 nn.1, 3 and the various authors
cited therein; see also DEBATING, supra note 6, at 11; see generally Zeev Maoz & Nasrin
Abdolali, Regime Types andInternationalConflict 1816-1976, 33 J. CONFLICT RES. 3 (1989).
A minority position-that democratic regimes are less conflict-prone in their relations with any
regime-type than are nondemocratic regimes-is maintained in, e.g., JAMES LEE RAY,
DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: AN EVALUATION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE
PROPOSITION 13-18, 33 (1995) (discussing, inter alia,the work of R.J. Rummel as a proponent
of the view that democracy is negatively correlated with conflict-involvement). But see Chan,
supranote 24, at 626 (Israel, India, and France-all commonly considered politically free-had
the highest war-per-year scores through 1980; Britain tied with U.S.S.R. for fourth place).
35. Among those who have found no difference in the war-initiation rates of democracies
as compared to nondemocracies, see MELVIN SMALL & J. DAVID SINGER, IN'TERNATIONAL WAR:
AN ANTHOLOGY VI (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter ANTHOLOGY] ("Although we are believers in
liberal democracy, we nevertheless reject the smug assertion that this form of political regime
is any less war prone than others; historical evidence shows that regime type has little to do
with the frequency with which nations initiate or are drawn into war."); see also Maoz &
Abdolali, supra note 34. Chan, supra note 24, at 639, found "a slight tendency for the freer
countries to fight less often on the side initiating a war" than could be expected by chance, but
this finding was not statistically significant; therefore he concluded that "the view that the freer
countries are less apt to start war... cannot be accepted with confidence."
36. As previously suggested in note 24 supra,commentators disagree on how to interpret
evidence across a variety of time spans. Since the normative universe of internationallaw
changed markedly with the adoption of the U.N. Charter in 1945, an important question is how
domestic constitutional processes have responded to that change. I intend to deal with that
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who deny that democracy plays a pacifying role in international
relations point to a number of episodes in which democratic states have
initiated (or are said to have initiated) major military action against
other (non-democratic) states. Prominent among the instances cited are
some of those to which Henkin devotes attention in How Nations
Behave, including Suez-Sinai (1956) (Israel, the United Kingdom and
France against Egypt),37 the Six-Day War (1967) (Israel against Egypt
and others),3" India's clashes with Pakistan over Kashmir (1965)' 9 and
Bangladesh (1971), 4 0 and U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war (19641975). 4 1 The bill of particulars against the democracies would grow
even larger with the inclusion of colonial wars or of small-scale
interventions.42
Evaluation of these episodes poses the threshold question ofwhat
it means to say that a democratic state has "initiated" the use of force.
We turn now to disentangling the divergent senses in which the concept

question in my work in progress.
37. See How NATIONS BEHAVE, supra note 2, at 250-68.
38. See id. at 172-73.
39. See id.at 170-71.
40. See id at 73, 122, 144, 157. Henkin discusses several of these forcible engagements
in exploration of the potential restraints of the U.N. Charter against more substantial or
prolonged wars. See id. at 146-53. In his view it is at least plausible that the law of the Charter
exerted sufficient influence over the behavior of the disputing states to prevent escalation to
even more serious bloodshed.
With respect to the issue of India's arguable propensities toward violent solutions,
Henkin notes in several places that India's takeover of the Portuguese enclave at Goa was
widely perceived as a violation of the Charter (although some contended that it was justified
in aid of self-determination or decolonization). See, e.g., id. at 42-43; 73-74 ("domestic
pressures.., helped to persuade the Indian government to take Goa by force"); 151, 169-70.
The Goa episode is not addressed in the democracy-and-peace literature, evidently because it
falls below the casualty threshold to qualify a conflict as "war" for purposes of that literature.
41. See id. at 303-12.
42. Most empirical research on the democracy-and-peace hypothesis applies the
definitional criteria of the Correlates of War Project (COW), according to which a conflict is
not coded as "war" unless 1000 battle fatalities have resulted. Also in accordance with COW
categories, most such research concentrates on interstate war (between members of the state
system) rather than on what COW calls "extrasystemic" wars (where at least one participant is
not yet a recognized state) or civil wars (occurring within a state). Under these coding
conventions, U.S. involvement in Vietnam would count as an interstate war, while the French
conflicts in Vietnam and Algeria would be treated as "extrasystemic" and therefore excluded
from quantitative analyses of interstate war patterns. Innumerable forcible interventions
resulting in less than 1000 fatalities (e.g., the United States in a variety of Latin American
countries; France many times in Africa) would likewise be excluded from the calculations.
On the methodology of the COW on points relevant to the present discussion, see
generally MELVIN SMALL & J. DAVID SINGER, RESORT TO ARMS: INTERNATIONAL AND CIVIL
WARS, 1816-1980, chs. 10-11 (2d ed. 1982) [hereinafter RESORT TO ARMS]; on applications

in democracy-and-peace research, see RusSErr, supra note 23, at 11-16.
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of war-initiation is invoked, as a predicate to a clearer understanding of
the relationship between constitutional organization and compliance
with the international norm against resort to force.
III.

DEMOCRATIC STATES AS "INITIATORS" OF WAR

Lawyers endeavoring to make use of political science research
on war-initiation must first confront vexing methodological problems,
beginning with the definitions of the terms and concepts at stake.
Political scientists who have tackled the war-initiation question43 apply
a variety of differing definitions and coding rules and thus do not
always agree among themselves about how to treatparticularcases. Nor
do these treatments necessarily coincide with the "definition of
aggression" under international law or other issues of legal significance;4' indeed, the authors working in this vein typically disclaim any
correspondencebetween their notion of "initiation" and the concept of
"aggression" as understood in international law.
Most democracy-and-peace research relies on the Correlatesof
War (COW) database for a vast array of quantitative information about
military conflicts between 1816 and 1980."5 That database contains a
coding for the "initiator" of each war in the compilation; but the
formulators of this classification acknowledged it to be "as crude as it
is tentative, resting solely on historians' consensus as to whose
battalions made the first attack in strength on their opponents' armies or
' Despite the surface plausibility of this approach (evidently
territories."46
motivated by a desire to remain in the realm of objective phenomena

43. Russett and colleagues eschewed the war-initiation question in

GRASPING THE

DEMOCRATIC PEACE but have not denied its importance. See RussErr, supra note 23, at 144-

45 n.3 ("We will not identify the initiator at each level. It might be valuable for some analyses
to know whether, when dealing with nondemocracies, democracies are more or less likely to
initiate the threat or use of force, but those questions are not at issue here. Moreover, simple
judgments about who was the first to shoot, for example, ignore complex questions about what
may have provoked the shooting"). Elsewhere Russett has written that the work of others
"suggests a mixed and still muddy picture: i.e., democracies are less likely to originate wars
with all kinds of states, but more likely to join ongoing wars being fought by other states."
Russett, The Fact of the DemocraticPeace,in DEBATING, supra note 6, at 58, 68 n.27; see also
Russett, Why DemocraticPeace?in DEBATING, supra note 6, at 82, 91 n.25 (citing studies by
Stuart A. Bremer). See also Chan, supra note 24, at 635-39 (noting that previous work by
Rummel had not addressed the war-initiation question, and suggesting possible tests of
hypotheses concerning correlation between regime-type and propensity to commence war).
44. See Definition of Aggression Resolution, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess.,
Supp. No. 31, at 142-43, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
45. On COW, see generally references in note 42, supra.
46. RESORT TO ARMS, supra note 42, at 194.
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and to refrain from applying value-laden concepts like "aggression"), 47
it is not free from difficulties. Even on its own terms, the "first attack
in strength" criterion is problematic in cases where an opening clash
occurs on disputed territory; moreover, "historians' consensus" is not
always easy to discern and may be disputable.4" For these reasons and
others, some political scientists investigating the democracy-and-peace
hypothesis have registered their disagreement with the COW's
"initiation" judgments as to certain conflicts.4 9 Such methodological
controversies underlying the identification of "initiators" cast doubt on

47. "[W]e are not labeling any government the 'aggressor' in these wars, or trying to reach
a firm, data-based conclusion as to which participant 'caused' the war, whether by action,
threat, or other provocation . . . . Indeed, one of the major objectives in our current
investigations is to uncover precisely the sequence of events that converted mere conflict into
bloody battle." RESORTTo ARMS, supranote 42, at 194; see alsoANTHOLOGY, supra note 35,
at 33 ("Clearly, initiator and aggressor are not always identical, as a participant might provoke
its adversary into military action by mobilization or other aggressive diplomatic or economic
actions. But the designation of the initiator of military aggression should nevertheless provide
some tentative clues as to the relative belligerency of system members."). See also Chan, supra
note 24, at 638.
For a similar distinction between "initiation" and "aggression," see BRUCE BUENo DE
MESQUrrA, THE WAR TRAP 99 (1981) ("'initiator' should not be equated with 'aggressor';
rather, it designates the state that, using the precedence of tort law, had the last reasonable
chance to avert the interstate collision represented by combat").
48. I am grateful to Mary Du Cray, a graduate student in political science at Columbia
University, for sharing with me her work in progress on war initiation and domestic regime
type, which exposes some of the problematic aspects of the definitions employed in the
literature.
49. A table (based on COW codings through 1980) showing states coded as initiators in
international wars may be found in Chan, supranote 24, at 644-47; see also RESORT TO ARMS,
supranote 42, Table 11.6. Democratic states are coded as initiators for Suez-Sinai (Israel-U.K.France, 1956), Vietnam (U.S. et al., 1965-1975), Second Kashmir (India, 1965), Six Days
(Israel, 1967), and Bangladesh (India, 1971). Chan admits that some of these codings are
debatable: e.g., the coding of the United States as the initiator in Vietnam "because it made the
first unambiguous attack across international borders (the Gulf of Tonkin incidents took place
in disputed waters, and the seventeenth parallel separating the two parts of Vietnam was a
provisional demarcation ....
" Chan, supra note 24, at 638-39.
For explanation of coding judgments (but some differences with COW on other
points), see THE WAR TRAP, supra note 47, at 99-100 n.5. For conflicts referred to in the
preceding paragraph and in notes 37-41, supra,Bueno de Mesquita agrees with COW in coding
the United States as initiator of the interstate phase of the Vietnam War (by virtue of the
sustained bombing of North Vietnam beginning in February 1965), Israel as initiator of the SixDay War against Egypt, Syria and Jordan in 1967, and India as initiator of the interstate aspect
of the Bangladesh war of 1971 ("Although the record shows that Pakistani aircraft attacked
Indian airfields, it appears that sustained Indian incursions into Pakistani territory preceded
those raids."). Id.
COW codes China as initiator of the 1962 Sino-Indian war, but this too may be
debated. See Chan, supra note 24, at 638 (China launched the first attack and thus was coded
as initiator, "even though India had made the first major move to occupy the disputed territory
and had spumed Peking's offer to negotiate.").
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the soundness of the supposed conclusion that democracies are no less
prone to war-initiation than other regime-types.
From the perspective of international law, the political scientists'
pretension of pursuing a supposedly objective definition of "initiation"
obscures fundamental questions of justification for the conduct so
categorized. Israel, for example, has been characterized as one of the
countries most inclined toward war-initiation, by virtue of having "first
attacked in strength" at Suez-Sinai in 1956, in the Six-Day War of 1967,
or in other engagements.5 0 While such classifications may have some
usefulness depending on the research inquiry," they are insufficient for
an effort to answer the international lawyer's question - that is,
whether a particular regime (or regime-type) complies with the
international law of the use of force. 2
The constitutional lawyer's question-how such a regime does
(or does not) bring about compliance-is likewise left underilluminated
when the focus is war-initiation defined as attacks in strength: how are
we to count, and account for, the many potential-war episodes that did
not mature into large-scale attack?53 Significantly, when the focus of
50. Israel's 1982 conflict in Lebanon falls outside the temporal scope of most of the
studies but has been mentioned by some as evidence of democratic Israel's less-than-pacific
tendencies. For a nuanced view of the Israeli experience, see Randall L. Schweller, Domestic
Structure andPreventive War: Are DemocraciesMore Pacific?,44 WORLD POLITICS 235,26467 (1992) (distinguishing between "preventive" wars and "preemptive" actions, with Israel's
moves in 1956 and 1967 having been provoked by hostile Arab actions and therefore not
"preventive" in the sense of a deliberate, unprovoked attack). Schweller treats Israel's 1981
strike on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor and the 1982 invasion of Lebanon as "preventive"
actions understandable in terms of the extreme external conditions faced by Israel. Schweller
thus views Israel as the exception thatprovesrather than disproves his basic proposition that
democracies do not initiate preventive war. See id. at 253. For discussion of that proposition
see infra notes 55-61.
51. The scholars who first attempted to classify initiators did so in order to study the
correlation between initiators and victors. To this effect, see RESORT TO ARMS, supra note 42,
at 294 ("the initiators 'win' in almost 70 percent of the interstate wars"); accordANTHOLOGY,
supra note 35, at 35-36; WAR TRAP, supra note 47, at 19-20 (since Napoleon's defeat at
Waterloo, three-quarters of all wars have been won by the initiating side; only 10% have been
quickly and decisively lost by the nation that attacked first). On war-initiation in situations
when the adversaries' relative power is shifting, see Schweller, supranote 50.
52. For attention to the strengths and weaknesses of arguments on the legality of some of
Israel's uses of force, see HOW NATIONS BEHAVE, supra note 2, at 172-73, 259-61 (characterizing Israel's position with respect to Suez as "not implausible" and allowing "a respectable claim
that it was acting in self-defense consistent with the law of the Charter" in 1967).
53. A different field of vision, for example, is found in the dataset on "militarized
interstate disputes," defined as "a set of interactions between or among states involving threats
to use military force, displays of military force, or actual uses of force. To be included, these
acts must be explicit, overt, nonaccidental, and government sanctioned." See Charles Gochman
& Zeev Maoz, Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976, 28 J. CONFLICT REs. 585, 587
(1984). The initiator of a militarized interstate dispute is "the state that has first committed an
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attention is potentially serious disputes that have been averted before
one side attacks another in strength, democracies may well have a more
pacific record than nondemocracies: one study of these kinds of
disputes found that "[d]emocratic states do not initiate fewer disputes
than nondemocracies, but the proportion of disputes in which they
participate that escalate to war is significantly lower than that of
nondemocratic polities."5 4
One of the few studies to look in depth at the question of how
domestic regime structure affects war-initiationdecisions has concluded
that "only nondemocratic regimes wage preventive wars against rising
' Factors disinclining democratic states toward preventive
opponents."55
war (in the sense of a deliberate and unprovoked attack) include the
public's resistance to the high costs of war, risk aversion in general, and
opposition in many democratic states to peacetime conscription. 6
Furthermore, because mobilization for war is public in a democracy,
democracies are ill-suitedto launching surprise attacks. 7 Of particular

action that included the threat, display, or use of force." See Maoz & Abdolali, supranote 34,
at 13. Accord THE WAR TRAP, supra note 47, at 99 (initiator is "the state that took the first
overt action (and not necessarily the state that aggressively started the dispute)").
See also the International Crisis Behavior Project, compiling incidents of"an increase
in the intensity of disruptive interaction between two or more adversaries, with a high
probability of military hostilities," with references collected in RUSSETT, supra note 23, at 75.
For an argument that a distinction equivalent in importance to that between initiator
and target is that between the state seeking a change in the status quo (innovator) and the state
seeking preservation of the status quo (defender), see RAY, supra note 34, at 196-97.
54. Maoz & Abdolali, supranote 34, at 18.
55. Schweller, supranote 50, at 238. But see WAR AND REASON, supra note 23, at 15860, 272-73 (using game theory to demonstrate the contention that "if one party is not a
democracy, then the democratic adversary faces a greater danger of being exploited. To avoid
this, the democracy is likely to launch a preemptive strike.").
On the distinction between "preemptive" and "preventive" wars, see generally Dan
Reiter, Exploding the Powder Keg Myth, 20 INT'L SEC. 5 (1995) ("preemptive" refers to cases
where the side striking first anticipates that it is about to be attacked; "preventive" entails
anticipation of a medium- or long-term threat). Schweller's theory accepts that democratic
states may vell respond to provocation with a preemptive strike, as in the case of Israel's
response to fedayeen terrorism and the blockade of Aqaba/Suez in 1956 or at the outbreak of
the Six-Day War in 1967. See Schweller, supranote 50, at 264.
56. See Schweller, supranote 50, at 24246. The moral sentiments of democratic polities
do not always discourage war, however. While the tendency in such polities is a moral
indignation against offensive preventive war, the humanitarian impulse can sometimes lead to
belligerence; and especially where the average citizen would predict a painless victory against

a weaker opponent, public opinion can promote and prolong war. For these reasons, Schweller
does not rule out preventive war by strong democracies against markedly weaker opponents.
See id. at 24142, 248.
57. "Apparently for these reasons, major-power democracies seem never to have launched
preventive war (a deliberate attack not under immediate provocation) against another major
power." See RussEmr, supranote 23, at 39 (citing Schweller, supranote 50).
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relevance to the present essay is the observation that "the separation of
powers represented by civilian control of military planning checks the
military's institutional preference for offensive doctrine, which is
necessary to fight preventive wars."58 Accordingly, civilian control may
well provide an important underpinning of the contemporary international legal order under which only defensive and not offensive wars are
permitted. 9
Of the war-initiation episodes attributed to democratic states,
some of the most significant involved plausible claims of self-defense
or other justification under international law. Depending on how the
facts are portrayed, the "first attack in strength" by the democratic side
against nondemocratic adversaries may well have complied with the
international law applicable to the situation. On the other hand, some
such episodes may indicate the ineffectiveness of the internal controls
that are supposed to restrain constitutional democracies from launching
illegitimate (or imprudent) wars.
The Suez crisis is suggestive of these complexities. In elaboration of Henkin's thoughtful treatment of the international legal aspects
in How Nations Behave, it may be noted that under the parliamentary
systems in place in all three of the intervening states, the prime
ministers acted in concert with each other but without consulting those
within their respective governments or parliaments who might have
counseled restraint. In his introduction to the 1963 reissue of Walter
Bagehot's classic The English Constitution, R.H.S. Crossman (M.P.)
cogently commented on the non-role in the Suez crisis of the Cabinet
(which Bagehot had portrayed a century earlier as the "efficient secret"
of British ministerial government):
[Prime Minister Anthony Eden] took the decisions and
prepared the plans for the Anglo-French attack on Port
Said without Cabinet consultation, and with the assistance
of only a handful of his colleagues and permanent advisers. After the secret was revealed, he was able until he
fell ill to enforce collective responsibility on a Cabinet
only informed of his policy when it was already doomed
to failure. He has been blamed for the policy; but no one
has suggested that he acted unconstitutionally. Here then

58. Schweller, supra note 50, at 245; see also id. at 249 (locating the explanation for the
phenomenon in "the difference between the state institutions of authoritarian and constitutional
regimes").
59. On international legal norms of self-defense, see id. at 246-47.
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it was demonstrated that a British premier is now entitled
on really momentous decisions to act first, and then to
face his Cabinet with the choice between collective
obedience or the political wilderness."
Along with Crossman, one might welcome a revival of the potential of
parliamentary government to guard against excessive centralization of
power, even "that the House of Commons should once again provide the
popular check on the executive."'"
IV.

DEMOCRACIES AS THE TARGETS OF USES OF FORCE BY OTHERS

The Falklands/Malvinas conflict can illustrate use of force by a
nondemocratic state to change the status quo in a dispute with a
democratic state. This characterizationis consistent with the prevailing
literature in political science which treats Argentina as autocratic at the
outbreak of the 1982 war and the United Kingdom as democratic,62 and
which likewise would treat the conflict as a war initiated by Argentina.63
There is room for fair argument as to which of the disputants had
the stronger underlying claim to legitimate title over the islands, as well
as on the merits of the self-determination issues and other points.'
Regardless of whether Argentina had the better legal arguments on the
questions of historical grievance, the resort to force elicited an immediate outcry at the United Nations, leading to the Security Council's
demand for an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the
60. R.H.S. Crossman, Introduction,in WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION
1, 55-56 (1963).
61. Id. at 56-57.
62. Cf RUSSETr, supra note 23, at 12, 94 (Argentina was "military dictatorship" at the
outbreak of war in 1982; the coding of"anocracy" for 1982 in the subsequent table is evidently
because of the transition toward restoration of civilian rule which the failure of the invasion
hastened); id. at 98 (U.K. as democracy).
63. On coding the Falklands conflict as "war" (though the number of battle fatalities fell
just below the threshold of 1000 typically employed for this purpose in the democracy-andpeace literature), see id. at 12-13. Russett and colleagues did not code "initiators" for their
study, see id. at 144-45 n.3, and the COW publications code initiators only through 1980; but,
applying the COW convention of "first attack in strength," it seems that Argentina would have
to be coded as the initiator, notwithstanding the dispute between the parties as to who had the
superior claim to sovereignty.
64. On some of the issues from the point of view of international law, see generally W.
Michael Reisman, The Strugglefor the Falklands,93 YALE L. J. 287 (1983); JULIUS GOEBEL,
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (1927, reissued 1982). Further references to
historical and legal considerations may be found in LAWRENCE FREEDMAN & VIRGINIA GAMBASTONEHOUSE, SIGNALS OF WAR: THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT OF 1982 423-424 (1991)
[hereinafter SIGNALS].
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islands.6" The dominant view (at least in the West) is that Argentina's
invasion violated legal obligations under articles 2(3) and 2(4) of the
U.N. Charter to settle disputes peacefully and to refrain from using
force. But in order to understand why the dispute eluded peaceful
settlement, domestic factors need to be considered.
What relevance did regime-structure on either the Argentine or
the British side have for the escalation of the dispute to forcible attack?
Attention should be paid to the internal decision-making processes of
each state, as well as to each side's perception of the other.
With respect to Argentina's internal organization, it has become
commonplace to assert that authoritarianism in the years leading up to
1982 predisposedArgentinatoward using military force to bring matters
to a head. The junta which had ruled the country brutally since 1976
apparently craved a victory in order to rally domestic support from a
demoralized populace. 6 Within the junta, information relevant to
Argentina's lack of military preparedness for such a venture was not
adequately incorporated into the decisional process 67-- a phenomenon
suggestive of Kant's point that tyrants do not typically benefit from sage
advice to discourage them from their military schemes.68 When the
venture failed, the discredited military regime soon collapsed and the
succeeding democratic government initiated an inquiry into the fiasco;
criminal investigations over mismanagement of the war ensued.69
It is necessary to take account, however, of how these domestic
factors on Argentina's side intersected with the domestic factors on the
U.K. side and the junta's perception of those factors. The junta
65. S.C. Res. 502 (Apr. 3, 1982) (calling the action a "breach of the peace"); see also S.C.
Res. 505 (May 26, 1982) (reaffirming Resolution 502). Though the rhetoric of aggression was
prominent in British political discourse concerning the conflict, no international body labeled
Argentina an aggressor. The avoidance of this label was evidently deliberate. See SIGNALS,
supra note 64, at 299.
66. Concerning this charge, see SIGNALS, supra note 64, at 4. See also Reisman, supra
note 64, at 287-88.
67. Cf, SIGNALS, supra note 64, at 23, 67-68, 82-83 (noting the small numbers involved
in the planning; the unready state of conscripts for active service; the unavailability of necessary
aircraft, vessels, missiles, and materiel; and the fact that Britain had not yet implemented a
1981 decision to reduce its naval presence in the South Atlantic); but see id. at 68-71
(concluding that it was actually Argentina's misperception of British intentions that triggered
the intervention, rather than Argentina's misjudgment of its own strength).
68. Tes6n, supra note 27, at 75 (citing Fernando Tes6n, Book Review, 81 AM. J. INT'L L.
556, 558 (1987)) ("Dictators inevitably become persuaded that they can get away with
anything.").
69. This activity later came to a halt when President Carlos Saul Menem pardoned the
senior generals and other high-ranking officers facing trials on these charges. See I
TRANSrTONAL JUSTICE 23-24, 76, 189, 427 (Neil Kritz ed., 1995).
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evidently did not or could not believe that Britain would actually go to
war to win back the Falklands. Although this inaccurate prediction may
have been based in part on certain "objective" factors like the distances
involved and Britain's meager economic stake in the islands, it
undoubtedly rested at least as heavily on erroneous perceptions of the
subjective aspects of intention and will. Did Prime Minister Thatcher's
government have the guts to fight? Would Parliament and public
opinion support her in what would have to be a costly, dangerous, and
risky struggle? It is apparent that the junta misjudged their adversary on
each of these points and wrongly predicted that an initial forceful move
would produce the desired concessions.7"
Why was Britain unwilling to make concessions, either before or
after the Argentinian attack? Some have speculated that Britain might
eventually have relinquished the islands to an Argentina under democratic control, but that there was no prospect of turning over the
islanders (against their own preferences) to a regime whose "dirty war"
against its own people was repugnant to the human rights values of
British public opinion. 71 Against this speculation it can be said, of
course, that little progress toward a negotiated solution had been made
during the decades before the military takeover of 1976, when the
political picture in Argentina was (if not fully "democratic") not as
bleak.
And why was it so difficult to make progress? At least some of
the blame may lie with Britain's pluralistic structure itself. A variety of
possibilities for winding down the British commitment in the South
Atlantic had been on the table for some time; but a well-organized
pressure group, the Falklands lobby, had put up fierce resistance to any
hint of concessions to Argentina running contrary to the islanders'
wishes. The reaction in Parliament to exploratory consultations on
possible compromises had been hostile. Even if the Thatcher government had been inclined to proceed with a negotiated settlement (for
example, on the basis of a proposal for a leaseback arrangement), such

70. On the junta's analysis of the "mixed signals" coming out of the British government
and House of Commons debates, see SIGNALS, supranote 64 at 10, 14-15, 68-71, 78-79, 200.
Ironically, the mistake may not have been a bad wager on dovishness but rather an erroneous
belief that Britain had determined to reinforce its military presence on the Islands (a more
hawkish strategy than British policymakers were actually inclined to follow at the time), so that
a preemptive move would have to be made before reinforcements could reach the Islands. See
id. at 71-77, 99; see also JoHN GREENAWAY, STEVE SMITH & JOHN STREET, DECMING
FACTORS IN BRITISH POLITICS 107 (1992).
71. See Clive Christie, The British Left and the Falldands War, 55 THE POL. Q. 288, 290,

303 (1984).

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[36:449

a plan would have faced substantial and determined parliamentary
opposition. Under such circumstances (not atypical in democratic
politics), the path of least resistance was to do nothing: Argentina then
forced a crisis by invading.72
The House of Commons, meeting in emergency sessions
following the invasion, was in no mood to consider compromises.
Although the Thatcher government came under severe criticism for not
having anticipated and prevented the crisis, full backing for a major
military response was assured. The label of "Parliament's war" for the
ensuing confrontationis perhaps not misplaced;73 and the hardening of
parliamentary positions following the invasion quite likely contributed
to the failure of the mediation attempted by U.S. Secretary of State
Alexander Haig.74
This review of the Argentine-British relationship suggests that
it was not either side's regime-structure on its own, but rather their
interaction, that set them on the path to war over the Falklands. It also
leaves room for the interpretation that a similar crisis between two
democratic governments could have been more susceptible to peaceful
settlement and less likely to lead to a breach of the peace or a violation
of international law.
The Argentinianjunta's misjudgment of parliamentary attitudes
toward the Falklands had tragic consequences, not least the 951 lives
lost in the war. But even more fateful consequences have ensued from
the inability of nondemocratic regimes to foresee that democratic states
would rally to aid nondemocratic objects of armed attack, resulting in
major wars with casualty levels several orders of magnitude higher than
in the Falklands. We now turn to that category of conflict.

72. On the matters summarized in this paragraph, see generally Christie, supranote 71,
at 289-91; GREENAWAY, supra note 70, at 95-107; Reisman, supra note 64, at 314-17;
SIGNALS, supra note 64, at 8-9, 26.
73. On parliamentary debates during the crisis, see PETER CALVERT, THE FALKLANDS
CRISIS: THE RIGHTS AND THE WRONGS 75-76 (1982); PAUL EDDY & MAGNUS LINKLATER, THE
FALKLANDS WAR 98 (1982); LAWRENCE FREEDMAN, BRITAIN AND THE FALKLANDS WAR 8486 (1988) ("The war has been described as 'Parliament's War' because of the extraordinarily
nationalistic debate that took place on the Saturday morning of 3 April .... ").
74. On Haig's shuttle diplomacy, see SIGNALS, supra note 64, at 165-243.
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MULTINATIONAL COLLECTIVE SECURITY ENGAGEMENTS

In several of the most significantmilitary engagements of the last
half-century, democratic states did not deter the outbreak of war but
entered with massive collective force after fighting had already begun
between nondemocratic states (or between factions within nondemocratic states). Major conflicts falling under this heading include the
Korean War (1950-1953), the Persian Gulf War (1990-1991), and the
conflict in former Yugoslavia (1991-1995), all of which entailed
involvement of the United Nations in authorizing a collective military
response, as well as the Indochina conflict of the 1960s and 1970s
(which the United States characterized in terms of collective selfdefense under the auspices of the South-EastAsia Treaty Organization).
For constitutional democraciesthat decided to participate in these
multinational endeavors, important questions of internal constitutional
law have arisen, including the scope of authority of the national
executive to embark on far-reaching military commitments. That
national constitutional considerations would be relevant to such
operations is evident on the face of the various postwar treaties
providing for collective military operations, including the United
Nations Charter,75 the Inter-AmericanTreaty of Reciprocal Assistance,76
and the North Atlantic Treaty." Within particular nation-states,
constitutional issues have received attention in connection with
parliamentary assent to the treaties and the adoption of implementing
legislation, as well as on the several occasions when the treaty commitments have been invoked to justify a national decision to dispatch
troops abroad.78
A salient question for comparative inquiry is the impact of
national constitutional requirements on the deterrent potential of such

75. U.N. CHARTER art. 43, para. 3 (stating that agreements to make armed forces available
to the United Nations "shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with
their respective constitutional processes.").
76. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, done at Rio de Janeiro, Sept. 2, 1947,
art. 20, 62 Stat. 1681, T.I.A.S. No. 1838 ("no State shall be required to use armed force without
its consent.").
77. North Atlantic Treaty, done at Washington, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 11, 63 Stat. 2241,
T.I.A.S. No. 1964 (treaty "shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in
accordance with their respective constitutional processes.").
78. For a thoughtful treatment of the U.S. constitutional questions, see generally Jane E.
Stromseth, Rethinking War Powers: Congress, The President,and The UnitedNations, 81 GEO.
L.J. 597 (1993). Compare Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, UN PoliceAction in Lieu of War:
"The Old Order Changeth", 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 63 (1991), with Michael J. Glennon, The
Constitutionand ChapterVII of the UnitedNations Charter,85 AM. J. INT'L L. 74 (1991).
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collective undertakings. According to one school of thought, the
effectiveness of collective security or defense arrangements depends
upon capacity to anticipate and respond with necessary urgency and
firmness to the dangers at stake; such capacity resides necessarily with
executive authorities and would likely be weakened by parliamentary
involvement (especially if multiple bodies had to be persuaded each
time a threat arose).79 With due respect for the reasonable concerns
underlying this point of view, it is at least equally plausible that
participation of national parliaments in scrutinizing and approving
collective military commitments could actually strengthen their
effectiveness.
The latter claim builds on Henkin's assertion in How Nations
Behave that congressional support for the U.N. Charter and the
N.A.T.O. treaty has bolstered the credibility of those commitments."
With respect to N.A.T.O., five decades of peace in Europe bear out the
validity of this insight, since allies and adversaries alike clearly
understood the depth and continuity of congressional (and public)
commitment to the collective enterprise. With respect to the U.N.
Charter, the picture is rather murkier. The Senate's approval of the
Charter in 1945 was not intended as an open-ended commitment to
whatever military challenges might arise thereafter; to the contrary,
both on the occasion of assent to the Charter and with the subsequent
enactment and amendment of the United Nations Participation Act, the
Senate and the Congress expressed their understanding that major
military commitments would have to be authorized by the Congress in
the exercise of its constitutional war powers prerogatives.81
Congress deferred to presidential initiative at the time of the
Korean war in 1950, but by the time of Iraq's attack on Kuwait in 1990,
it had reasserted its own constitutional role. Both cases, of course,
represent failures of deterrence in the sense that the attackers misjudged
the likelihood that major powers would come to the victims' aid. The
congressional endorsement of the U.S. military response in the
Authorization for Use of Military Force in Iraq Resolution 2 was not
only a fulfillment of Congress's constitutional responsibility, but also

79. See, e.g., Bernard H. Oxman, The Relevance of the InternationalOrder to the Internal
Allocation of Powers to Use Force, 50 U. MIAmI L. REV. 129, 139-41 (1995).
80. See How NATIONS BEHAVE, supra note 2.
81. See Stromseth, supra note 78, for a full discussion of the treatment of these points in
congressional deliberations.
82. Pub. L. No. 102-1, 105 Stat. 3 (Jan. 14, 1991).
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a signal to Saddam Hussein (and other potential aggressors) that the
United States of America was fully committedto this military operation.
If a trend may be discerned over the five decades of the postWorld War II period, it is toward closer involvement of parliaments in
ensuring the support of their respective polities for collective military
operations. In the Korean War a number of democratic statesjoined the
U.S.-led coalition, but their parliaments were largely passive or reactive,
just as the U.S. Congress had been. By the time of the Persian Gulf
War, with a larger number of democratic countries participating,
national parliaments were much more actively engaged in validating the
national commitments.83 The significance of this pattern of national
actions transcends the political symbolism or the particular legal
contexts in which the respective votes were taken.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This sketch of research issues at the interface of the domestic and
international legal orders on use of force can only hint at a rich array of
questions meriting interdisciplinary research. As a further step in the
project, it will be important to consider the implications for polities
undergoing transformationto constitutional democracies, or indeed for
ones with significant democratic experience but where civilian control
over the military is not yet secure. The well-established democracies
offer more than one model for constitutional control of military
activities, but the particular variations in constitutional technique matter
less than the core values of constitutionalism to which we all are
committed.
Arguably, transparency of policymaking processes governing
military activity could be a factor decreasing the risk of escalation of
disputes to war, to the extent that misperception of a democratic state's
actual intentions can be avoided. On the other hand, the existence of
competing power centers within pluralistic societies may make it harder
rather than easier for their political leaders to achieve peaceful settlement of disputes with nondemocratic states; and when such disagreements fester inconclusively for years, one side or the other may be
tempted to precipitate a violent solution. A fuller understanding of
these processes should lead to a greater appreciation of the role of

83. For a summary of legislative actions, see Damrosch, supranote 1. My forthcoming
book deals in greater depth with the constitutional significance for the participating countries
of these national approvals.
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internal constitutional governance in ensuring compliance with
international law.

